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LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR WANTON AND MALICIOUS
ACTS OF SERVANT
The well settled principle which binds a master for his
servant's negligent acts is not in all instances and phases
applicable to cases of wanton and malicious acts of servants.
The earlier rule in both England and in the majority of the
United. States tended to exonerate the master from claims arising from injured third persons caused by wanton or wilful acts
of servants. The case of PittsburgPassengerCo. v. Donahue,'
as an example, held that the defendant company, as master,
was not liable for injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
its servant's wantonly striking the plaintiff and causing him to
fall under a car, thus causing his injuries.
The rule has been gradually extended. The general tendency, since "the extension, is illustrated by a Missouri case,
which holds the master liable for the act of a servant in maliciously turning a rail, causing it to strike a third person, the
act being committed while in the employ of the defenaant.2
This change has so completely taken place both in England
and in this country, except in a few jursidictions, that a conservative rule may be laid down, such as, "The master is liable
for malicious and wanton acts of his servants committed in the
course of his employmeht and within its scope.". 3 'Even in excess of this general doctrine, the master is often held liable for
an employee's acts, though they be beyond the authority given
by the master.4
Let us discuss the words "wilful" and "wanton."
It is
well to say concerning the former that the most logical interpretation of its application in this particular sense, Is, "An act
committed with implication of evil intent or legal malice, or with
absence of reasonable ground for believing the act in question
to be lawful.'' 5 In regard to the latter, a suitable definition is,
170 Pa. 119 (1871).
Hellriegel v. Dunham, 179 S. W. (Mo.) 763.
zMechem on Agency, sec. 1960 (2nd Ed.).
4Postal Telegraph Co. v. Brantley, 107 Ala. 683, 18 'So. 321 (1895);
Barden v. Felh, 109 Mass. 154 (1871).
OMechem on Agency, Sec. 1926 (2nd Ed.).
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"An act committed in a reckless manner without respect to the
rights of others, though without any settled malice." 6 "Where
an act is committed wantonly, a master is excused where the
servant deserts his employer's interests to prosecute his own
personal desires. 7 Acts done in the course of employment and
within the scope of authority do not, by reason of improper performance, exonerate the master from injuries caused to a third
person. Such performance is considered as wanton and reckless. If, however, the servant takes advantage of existing circumstances to prosecute a personal spite against the third person, and does carry out such selfish desire, the master's interests
are presumed deserted though the servant still is engaged in the
execution of his employer's business, and the master will not be
liable for injury suffered by the third person.8 The Kentucky
court holds, however, that the fact that the malicious act was
beyond or without authority of the master does not relieve the
master's duty to select servants that will not commit such acts.9

The last example brings in the importance of the "motive"
in determining whether or not the master shall be held; but the
question of motive is linked closely with the question: "whose
business and interests are being furthered or executed at the
time of the commission of the act from which the complaint
arises?" An excellent test or "dividing line" is drawn in the
case of Wallace v. Casey.' 0 The answer is given in this form,
"Whether or not liablity rests with the master is dependent
upon whether the act was prosecuted in furtherance of the
master's interests or in pursuit of interests other than the
master's. "
There are several classes of master-servant relationships
which necessitate a variance from the generally applied rules or
doctrines. These are roughly divisible into three groups.
The first is where by the very nature of the master's business a special duty is owed to the public, and where through the
dangerousness of the business, misconduct of the servant may
endanger the person and property of many individuals. In such
SBouvier's Law Dictionary.
IIL. & X. 1. R. Co. v. Routt, 76 S. W. (Ky.) 513 (1903).
'L. & X. R. R. Go. v. Routt, 76 S. W. (Ky.) 513 (1903).
0C.& 0. R. R. Co. v. Francisco, 149 Ky. 307, 148 S. W. 46 (1912).
116 N. Y. S. 394 (1909).
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cases the law necessarily places a greater burden upon the
master, regardless of wantonness or wilfulness of the employee,
or whether or not the particular injurious act was toward a
furtherance of the employer's business. The common-carrier
is an excellent example of this classification. A Kentucky case"
emphatically supports this variance by holding the railroad company liable for abuse and assault of a passenger by its conductor. The fact that the servant was insane was no defense,
the law placing a duty upon the master to use such diligence in
the selection of his servants as to extend to the public that special
duty owed by the employer. New York courts' 2 uphold this
rule by deciding that a merchant was liable for his servant's
wilful misconduct toward a customer, there being an' implied
invitation for the public to enter the store thereby placing
upon the owner a higher degree of responsibility for his saftey.
A second class of exceptions or variances are instances in
which the master confides a dangerous instrumentality to his
servant. The early tendency in such cases is to hold the master
to a high degree of liability because of his having placed an object of such a nature as to be likely to cause damage or injury to
third persons in the hands of -his servants.' 3 One of such cases
was WToolfolk v. Columbus Railroad Co.,14 in which the defendant's engineer maliciously blew his whistle with intent to
scare the plaintiff's horses.
In connection with such cases, imputed notice might be
mentioned as treated in the case of Brice v. Bauer.'1 This case
held that where a servant is entrusted with a vicious or
dangerous animal or chattel, and -the servant had knowledge
of its dangerousness, such knowledge was thereby imputed to
the master and he was held liable for damages caused by such
dangerous instrumentality.
The third class is one of instances where a master entrusts
a task to his servant, the performance of which involves the use
of force. In such instances the master is held liable for damages
caused thereby, though the servant employs force in excess of
that necessary to accomplish the purpose of his master. A leadU. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Francisco,149 Ky. 307, 148 S. W. 46.
"Swinarton v. Boutillier, 28 N. Y. S. 53 (1894).
nleath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 607.
u 128 Ga.631, 58 S. E. 152 (1907).
'108 N. Y. 428,15 N. E. 695 (1888).
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ing case in point deals with the employment of a servant to prevent unprivileged persons from fishing on, the premises of the
employer. In the course of ousting such a trespasser, an altercation arose and the servant assaulted the plaintiff with a knife,
causing bodily injury. The master was held liable, although the
force used by the servant was in excess of that necessary to complete his master's business. 16 In such cases proof by the master
that the servant did not act m compliance with the master's in17
structions is no defense.
There are also circumstances which make it c6nvenient for
the servant, with little or no deviation from his master's business,
to §o modify the existing circumstances as to be able to prosecute a selfish desire to bring injury to a third person. In the
case of Copelin v. Berlin Dye Works ,18 a master was held liable
for goods stolen by a servant from clothing to be cleaned in his
master's establishment, although there was no slpecial duty upon
the master, as a cleaner of clothing, to use other than slight care
in searching for articles left in the clothing by his customers.
It is evident from the circumstances and cases previously
discussed, that the question arises as to whether "the scope of
the servant's employment" exceeds the "motive" or vice versa,
in deciding the master's liability. The scope of employment is
usually considered more important; although a number of jurisdicti ns consider the motive of the servant to be the deciding
factor. 19 The question as to whether or not a servant Is acting
in the course of his employment is one of fact unless only one
inference can logically be drawn, whereby the court may decide the question.20 In all such cases careful instructions as
to applicable law must be given to the jury by the court.
In all these tort actions, there arises the question of the
master's liability for damages complained of by the plaintiff
as an injured party. The majority rule is to assess damages as
though the master had caused the injury and committed the tort
21
himself.
New EJ erslie Fishing Club v. Stewart, 123 Ky. 8, 93 S. W. 598
(1906).
ITTiZlar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 131 S. W. 969 (1910).
168 Calif. 715, 144 Pac. 961 (1914).
'Limpus v. Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526 (1863).
Collins v. Butler, 179 N. Y. 156, 71 N. E. 746 (1904).
;'Denver Railroad Co. v. Harris,122 U. S. 697 (1886).
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There is a conflict of authorities in iegard to the assessment
of punitive damages, but there is a tendency to relieve the
master where he has neither by expression nor implication
authorized or ratified the act of the servant. 2 2 There are
jurisdictions which refuse such exemptions where the defendant
is a corporation, the reason being that inasmuch as corporations
can act only through servants, they should not be wholly exempt
23
from punitive and exemplary damages on that account.
Where the evidence shows that the master has authorized
6r ratified the servant's wilful and malicious acts, the master
cannot be relieved from such liability as would rest upon him
had he committed the wrongs complained of personally. Usually
the retaining of a servant in the employ of the same master is
not a ratification of the servant's previous acts,' but failure of
a master to restrain his employee's continuous wrongful acts,
such acts being in the employer's knowledge, has been held
equivalent to ratification and the master has been held liable for
24
injury resulting from such acts.
With the brief treatment of various examples and circumstances above, it is well to draw, in conclusion, a general rule for
determining a master's liability for his servant's malicious and
wanton acts. It seems that the following rule is widely applicaable: A master is liable for the malicious and wilful acts of
his servant committed in. the course of his employment and
within its scope, although such acts were not expressly authorized or ratified by the master, or even if such acts were beyond the authority given to the servant or in disobedience of the
master's instructions, the servant's motive or intention being
immaterial. Such acts are imputed to the master by the doctrine
of respondeat superior in accordance with the general rules of
agency. If, however, by the nature of the act, it is doubtful
whether or not the act is within the scope of the servant's employment, the nature of the act itself is to be taken into consideration.
WmLAm H. BucEvEs.

v. Southern Pacific Go., 113 Calif. 105, 45 Pac. 187 (1896).
"Everingham v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 127 N. W. (Ia.) 1009 (1910).
"Hogle v. FranklinMfg. Co., 112 N. Y. S. 881 (1908).
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